SAKURA Law Office | Legal Update by Managing Partner Kenshiro Michishita
September 30, 2026 (fully revised October 6, 2026)
SAKURA Law Office | Kenshiro Michishita, Managing Partner
SAKURA Law Office has fully revised the twenty-sixth edition of the Legal Update series by Managing Partner Kenshiro Michishita. This edition treats Japanese market-abuse regulation as a single governance discipline running from investment decisions and order design through public communications, algorithmic systems, short selling, surveillance, investigations and regulatory response. It is written for listed companies, General Counsel, securities firms, asset managers, hedge funds, proprietary trading desks, private equity sponsors, overseas investors and other market participants that need to understand not only the statutory prohibitions but how order-driven markets are reconstructed in practice.
Japanese law does not treat every trade that moves a price as manipulation. Article 159 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (FIEA) addresses, among other conduct, fictitious and matched transactions and inducement-based manipulative trading. Article 158 separately prohibits specified dissemination of rumours and the use of fraudulent means. Legitimate market making, hedging, arbitrage, index rebalancing and portfolio execution can have substantial effects on price and order-book depth. The legal question is therefore not simply whether the market moved, but whether purpose, economic rationale and genuine execution intent are consistent with the market appearance created by the orders and trades.
The 2026 enforcement record makes that distinction operational. In the BASE FOOD and two other securities matter, the SESC alleged the use of large displayed orders to shape the order book while the trader transacted on the opposite side; on September 17, 2026, the FSA issued a final administrative monetary penalty payment order of JPY 6.27 million following the earlier recommendation. The September 15 Ecomic recommendation involved self-matching, price lifting and layered buy orders over ten trading days. The Sigmago matter involved a Hong Kong proprietary trader and assistance from regulators in China, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, while the Super Value matter resulted in a criminal charge. Orders, amendments, cancellations, related accounts, devices, funding, communications and algorithmic records can all form part of the evidentiary picture.
The regulatory framework is also changing. Act No. 64 of 2026, promulgated on July 23, 2026, includes a revised administrative monetary penalty methodology for market manipulation and other unfair trading conducted through high-speed trading, as well as enhanced treatment of misconduct using another person’s account and cooperation by account providers. The separate provisions increasing penalties for unregistered business took effect on August 12, 2026, but the high-speed-trading penalty-calculation reforms discussed in this Update remain enacted but not yet in force as of October 6, 2026. Current law and enacted-but-uncommenced reforms must therefore be tracked separately.
This Update reflects Japanese law and official SESC, FSA and Japan Exchange Group (JPX) materials available as of October 6, 2026, including the SESC’s June 2026 administrative monetary penalty casebook, the latest 2026 enforcement releases, the FSA’s September 30 update on high-speed-trading trends and current JPX short-selling materials. Its purpose is to translate the legal framework into operating decisions: strategy approval, order controls, public communications, short-position monitoring, model governance, evidence preservation, escalation and cross-border response.
Executive Summary
Market manipulation in Japan is not determined by price impact alone. Article 159 requires close attention to the statutory category, purpose, economic substance and the appearance created in the market. Wash or matched trading, self-matching, price ramping or marking down, price support, marking the close and spoofing may present different legal questions and often occur in combination. A sound investigation reconstructs the strategy across positions, orders, executions, amendments, cancellations and related accounts rather than attaching a label to a single order.
Article 158 has become increasingly important in an information-driven market. The 2024 Human Metabolome Technologies matter was the first SESC administrative monetary penalty recommendation for rumour dissemination and concerned an internet-board post containing information without a reasonable basis, made as part of a plan to increase the price and sell into the rise. The 2025 “special spoofing” matter is equally important because a deceptive order mechanism, rather than a verbal statement, was treated as a fraudulent scheme. Public statements, research, social media, positions and surrounding trades should therefore be governed together.
Algorithmic trading is not synonymous with the statutory category of “high-speed trading.” Japan has required registration for persons engaging in defined high-speed trading since April 2018, but not every automated strategy falls within that category. Regardless of registration status, automation can create market-abuse risk if a strategy is designed to display liquidity without genuine execution intent, repeatedly self-match or distort a benchmark. Governance must extend to code, parameters, testing, change control, kill authority, surveillance and contemporaneous strategy rationale.
Short selling is lawful in Japan but subject to a separate framework. JPX explains that sell orders must be classified as long or short; a trigger-based price restriction activates once the price falls by 10% from the day’s base price and generally continues through the end of the following trading day; short-position reporting begins at 0.2% of outstanding shares and public disclosure at 0.5%, subject to detailed rules and exemptions. Compliance with those mechanics does not immunize a wider strategy from Article 158 or 159.
When a concern arises, the first objective should be to freeze the objective record before informal interviews alter it. Complete order-event data, market data, algorithm versions and parameters, API logs, communications, device and authentication data, investment records, related accounts, funding and approvals may all be time-sensitive. Mature market-integrity compliance is therefore an operating system designed for explainability: the organization should be able to show, from records created at the time, why a position existed, why an order was entered or cancelled and which controls were active.
1. The Legal Architecture: Distinguishing Legitimate Price Impact from a False or Artificial Market Appearance
Every meaningful order can affect the market. A large acquisition may lift price; a forced risk reduction may push it down; an index rebalance or customer hedge may concentrate trading near the close. Those effects are part of ordinary price formation. Japanese market-abuse law is concerned with a different problem: conduct that creates a misleading or artificial appearance of supply, demand, activity or price and thereby interferes with the market’s information function. Price impact is therefore evidence, not the legal conclusion.
Article 159(1) addresses specified fictitious and matched transactions undertaken with the statutory purpose of misleading others about the state of trading. Article 159(2) addresses specified series of trades and orders undertaken with an inducement purpose and capable of creating a misleading appearance of active trading or artificially affecting price. Market terminology such as wash trading, self-matching, ramping, marking down, price support, marking the close and spoofing does not map perfectly onto individual statutory provisions. Article 158 may also become relevant where the mechanism is fundamentally deceptive. The SESC’s June 2026 casebook reports that approximately 60% of recent manipulation recommendations involved more than one technique, which is why a single-factor screen is not a legal analysis.
An internal investigation should reconstruct the complete economic strategy. What position was the firm trying to establish or reduce? What benchmark, client mandate, hedge relationship or risk limit drove the execution? What did the trader or algorithm expect to execute, and under what conditions would the order be cancelled? Were there related positions or accounts that benefited from the displayed order flow? A post-hoc statement that “it was a hedge” is weaker than contemporaneous investment and execution records that show the rationale existed at the time.
This approach also protects legitimate strategies. The purpose of market-integrity regulation is not to penalize scale, speed or sophisticated execution merely because the market moved. Compliance surveillance should therefore use cancellation ratios, self-trade rates, price impact and similar metrics as investigative triggers rather than fixed safe harbours or presumptions of illegality. The ultimate assessment should connect market appearance to execution intent, economic rationale and the full position.
2. Spoofing, Self-Matching and Price Ramping: 2026 Enforcement Shows Why the Full Order Lifecycle Matters
The 2026 cases demonstrate that unexecuted orders can be as important as completed trades. In the BASE FOOD matter, the SESC described large displayed orders that thickened one side of the order book while the trader transacted on the other side. The FSA’s September 17, 2026 final order imposed a JPY 6.27 million administrative monetary penalty. That procedural distinction matters: an SESC recommendation and an FSA final payment order are not the same stage of enforcement, and companies should track the status of public cases precisely.
The September 15 Ecomic recommendation illustrates a composite pattern. The SESC described sell orders entered against the trader’s own buy orders, purchases through market or above-last-price limit orders that lifted price, and multiple layered buy orders over ten trading days. The lesson is not that any self-match or high cancellation rate is unlawful. Independent desks or algorithms can cross accidentally. But repeated self-matching aligned with price formation, beneficial positions and weak preventive controls presents a very different evidentiary picture.
Cross-border execution does not change the analysis. The Sigmago recommendation concerned a Hong Kong proprietary trading company and five Japanese securities; the SESC acknowledged assistance from the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, the UK Financial Conduct Authority and Japan Exchange Regulation. The Super Value criminal matter involved multiple named accounts and a combination of price-lowering, price-raising and fictitious transactions. Overseas brokers, foreign entities and third-party account names do not create a jurisdictional or evidentiary blind spot.
For asset managers and proprietary desks, the monitoring data set should therefore cover the complete order lifecycle: submission, amendment, cancellation, time in the book, execution rate, displayed depth, opposite-side trading, self- or related-account interaction, position changes and market response. Alert thresholds can be useful, but an effective review asks whether the strategy had a legitimate economic purpose and whether the displayed liquidity accurately reflected genuine trading interest.
3. Social Media, Short Research and Issuer Communications: Information and Trading Must Be Assessed Together
Article 158 prohibits specified rumour dissemination and fraudulent means in securities-related or price-affecting contexts. In a market where a post, video or research note can move a thinly traded stock within seconds, trading surveillance and communications review cannot operate in separate silos. Counsel should consider the factual basis, distinction between fact and opinion, audience and distribution channel, speaker’s position, known contrary information and trading before and after publication.
The 2024 Human Metabolome Technologies matter is a key reference point. The SESC recommended an administrative monetary penalty after finding that an individual, intending to increase the share price and sell into the move, posted information without a reasonable basis on an online finance bulletin board. Labels such as “personal opinion” or “prediction” are not dispositive where the communication contains unsupported factual assertions used as part of a trading strategy. Firms that publish investment views should preserve the source record supporting material factual statements and manage conflicts around the publisher’s own position.
Article 158 is not limited to words. In the 2025 Okamura Foods “special spoofing” matter, the SESC treated a deceptive closing-auction order strategy as a fraudulent means. The orders were used to create a misleading appearance about the closing imbalance and influence other participants before being changed immediately before the close. This illustrates why a deceptive mechanism should not automatically be forced into a conventional spoofing analysis under Article 159 when the essence of the conduct is a different form of fraud.
Critical short-seller research is not unlawful merely because it is negative or because the publisher has a short position. Nor does disclosing that short position provide a safe harbour. The factual foundation, fair presentation of sources, separation of verified fact from inference, handling of contrary material and relationship between publication and trading all matter. Listed companies responding to hostile research or online rumours should apply the same discipline: verify facts, coordinate legal, IR and disclosure functions, protect inside information and avoid an emotional response that itself becomes misleading market communication.
4. Algorithmic and High-Speed Trading: Code, Model Governance and the Enacted-but-Uncommenced 2026 Reform
Algorithmic execution is ordinary market infrastructure. Market making, arbitrage, hedging, index tracking, smart order routing and order slicing can produce large numbers of orders and rapid cancellations. High cancellation activity is therefore not a legal test for manipulation. Risk increases where a strategy is designed to display liquidity without genuine execution intent, repeatedly self-match, move a benchmark or influence other participants for the benefit of a separate position. Automation changes the primary evidence from memory to code and logs; it does not change the underlying market-integrity standard.
Algorithmic trading should also be distinguished from the statutory category of high-speed trading. Japan introduced registration for persons engaging in defined high-speed trading in April 2018, and the FSA continues to publish data on market activity. On September 30, 2026, it released the latest data covering January through June 2026. Whether registration is required depends on statutory criteria concerning electronic and automated decision-making and the architecture used to reduce communication latency to an exchange; use of an algorithm alone is not enough.
A mature trading organization governs a strategy before deployment and throughout its life cycle. The approval record should identify the objective, expected market footprint, order logic, cancellation conditions, self-trade controls, price and size limits, maximum risk and emergency-stop conditions. Code and parameters should be version-controlled, testing should include adverse market states, material changes should require documented approval, and an independent risk or compliance function should have authority to suspend the strategy. Vendor-provided algorithms and routing systems require equivalent change and log governance.
Act No. 64 of 2026 introduces an important future enforcement change. The legislative materials provide for daily calculation of administrative monetary penalties for specified unfair trading conducted through high-speed trading and for lowering the de minimis rounding threshold from amounts below JPY 10,000 to amounts below JPY 1. The Act also addresses unfair trading through another person’s account and cooperation by account providers. These market-abuse provisions are enacted but not yet in force as of October 6, 2026. The separate unregistered-business penalty provisions took effect on August 12. Compliance teams should therefore maintain an implementation map separating current law from future commencement.
5. Short Selling and Market Abuse Are Separate Regimes: A Short Strategy Must Satisfy Both
Short selling is not generally prohibited in Japan. It supports price discovery, hedging, arbitrage and market-neutral strategies. It is nevertheless subject to a framework separate from Articles 158 and 159, including marking and confirmation, a trigger-based price restriction, position reporting and transaction-specific exemptions. A professional short strategy must therefore answer two different questions: does the transaction comply with the technical short-selling regime, and is the broader trading and communications strategy free from manipulation or deception?
JPX explains that investors must identify sell orders as long or short and brokers must confirm and transmit that classification. The price restriction is not continuously active. It becomes active when the traded price falls by 10% from the issue’s base price and generally remains in force through the end of the following trading day. Execution systems should therefore ingest the live regulatory state rather than use a static daily flag.
Position reporting is another operational threshold. Under the JPX framework, reporting is required when a short position reaches 0.2% of outstanding shares, and positions of 0.5% or more are publicly disclosed by the exchange. Before those thresholds are approached, a fund complex should determine the reporting entity, aggregation logic, denominator, securities lending and derivative treatment, reporting channel and applicable exemptions. A global short-position system may not automatically produce the Japanese calculation.
Technical short-sale compliance does not immunize a wider strategy. A properly marked short sale may still form part of spoofing, abusive marking of the close, a manipulative sell-down or a deceptive information campaign. Conversely, a legitimate short thesis does not become manipulation merely because the issuer’s share price declines. The position, borrow, orders, hedges, research, social-media communications and corporate events should be capable of being explained as one coherent strategy.
6. Surveillance, Investigations and Cross-Border Enforcement: Freeze the Objective Record Before Asking What Happened
Japanese market surveillance is layered. Exchanges and Japan Exchange Regulation monitor order and trading activity, securities firms conduct customer and transaction surveillance, and the SESC conducts transaction investigations, administrative monetary penalty inspections and criminal investigations. The Ecomic release expressly notes the use of information provided by Japan Exchange Regulation, while the Sigmago matter demonstrates international regulatory cooperation. Market participants should not assume that a review will be confined to one brokerage account or one domestic data source.
The December 2025 criminal charge involving unauthorized access adds a cyber dimension. According to the SESC, third-party brokerage accounts were allegedly used without authorization in manipulative activity involving price-raising, large lower-price buy orders and pre-arranged transactions. For securities firms and asset managers, account compromise should therefore be treated not only as a customer-asset and cybersecurity event but also as a potential market-abuse event capable of injecting manipulative orders into the market.
When a concern arises internally, the first task is to preserve the factual record. Relevant evidence may include every order event and execution, amendments and cancellations, sub-second timestamps, contemporaneous order-book data, algorithm source or executable versions, parameters, API logs, chat and email, investment theses, client instructions, device and authentication logs, related accounts, funding flows, positions and approvals. Short-retention cloud logs and transient system data should be placed under an appropriate preservation hold before routine deletion occurs.
Interviews should generally follow preservation and preliminary reconstruction. Informal questioning before the data is secured can alter recollections, trigger deletion or enable participants to coordinate narratives. Legal and compliance teams should also determine whether further trading should be restricted, whether independent external counsel is needed, how confidentiality and privilege issues will be managed across jurisdictions, and whether communications with a broker, exchange, the SESC or the market are required. Cross-border employment, privacy and data-transfer rules can become part of the investigation architecture.
7. The Governance Objective Is Explainable Trading, Not a Longer List of Prohibitions
Market-integrity incidents often arise at organizational interfaces rather than from a single trader consciously violating a rule. Two portfolio managers may trade the same security in opposite directions; an algorithm may interact with another desk’s orders; an IR team may respond to a rumour while the company is conducting a buyback; an external technology vendor may change routing logic without a compliance review. A written prohibition on “market manipulation” does little unless trading, technology, risk, communications, cybersecurity and investigations are connected.
For securities firms, asset managers, hedge funds and proprietary desks, an effective framework can link strategy approval, related-account mapping, pre-trade self-match and price controls, post-trade surveillance, independent alert review, exception governance, model-change control, short-position threshold management and periodic testing. For listed companies, the same market-integrity mindset should connect share repurchases, employee dealing, timely disclosure, IR and social media, inside-information controls, hostile research response and crisis management for abnormal trading.
One of the strongest preventive controls is contemporaneous explainability. The organization should be able to answer from records created at the time why the position existed, why the order was sent at that price and time, why it was amended or cancelled, how the system handled potential self-matches, what position existed when a research note or social-media statement was published and which control was active. That record protects legitimate trading and allows misconduct or control failure to be identified before it becomes systemic.
SAKURA Law Office and Managing Partner Kenshiro Michishita treat No. 24 on insider trading, No. 25 on tender offers and large-shareholding reporting, and this No. 26 as a connected body of Japanese listed-company and capital-markets governance. Market manipulation, rumours, fraudulent schemes, short selling and algorithmic trading frequently intersect with M&A, capital policy, public disclosure, cybersecurity, cross-border activity and internal investigations. The practical objective is a single, defensible timeline of decisions, orders, communications, surveillance and evidence from ordinary operations through a regulatory inquiry.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q1. If an investor buys aggressively because it wants the share price to rise, is that automatically market manipulation?
No. A desire or expectation that a purchase will support the price, and actual price impact, do not by themselves establish manipulation. The statutory category, relevant purpose, order and trade pattern, economic rationale and related positions must be assessed. Fictitious or matched trading presents a different analysis from ordinary aggressive execution.
Q2. Does a large order become spoofing if it is cancelled after a few seconds?
Not automatically. Cancellation speed or cancellation ratio is not a standalone legal test. The relevant questions include genuine execution intent at entry, the order-book appearance created, opposite-side trading, repetition and economic rationale. Algorithmic strategies should retain the logic and parameters that explain entry and cancellation.
Q3. Is an accidental self-match between two independent algorithms automatically a prohibited wash trade?
Not necessarily. The statutory analysis includes purpose and the specific facts. An incidental cross can occur in a complex organization. Repeated self-matching aligned with price movement, beneficial positions and weak preventive controls will be assessed differently. Firms should use appropriate self-trade controls and independent review.
Q4. May an investor publish bullish or bearish views about a listed company on social media?
Legitimate opinion and analysis are not prohibited. Risk arises where unsupported, false or materially misleading factual information is disseminated in a securities-related or price-affecting context. A “personal opinion” label is not decisive. Factual support, the distinction between fact and inference, the speaker’s position and surrounding trading are important.
Q5. Can a short seller publish critical research while holding a short position?
Potentially yes. A negative view and a disclosed short position are not inherently unlawful. The publisher should, however, be able to substantiate factual assertions, distinguish fact from inference, address material contrary information fairly and manage position disclosures. Disclosure of the short position is not a safe harbour for false or deceptive conduct.
Q6. Must every firm using algorithmic trading register as a high-speed trader in Japan?
No. “High-speed trading” is a defined statutory category with specific criteria. Not every automated or algorithmic strategy is within it. The firm should analyse its decision and order-transmission architecture against the legal definition. Market-abuse rules can apply to an algorithmic strategy regardless of registration status.
Q7. What are the principal Japanese short-sale trigger and position-reporting thresholds?
JPX states that the price restriction is triggered when the traded price falls by 10% from the issue’s base price and generally remains effective through the end of the following trading day. Short-position reporting begins at 0.2% of outstanding shares, and positions at or above 0.5% are publicly disclosed, subject to detailed rules and exemptions.
Q8. Can a foreign fund trading Japanese shares through an overseas broker be subject to Japanese market-manipulation rules?
Yes. The 2026 Sigmago recommendation involved a Hong Kong company trading Japanese listed securities, and the SESC disclosed assistance from multiple overseas regulators. Japanese law may apply to conduct in the Japanese market while home-jurisdiction rules may also apply.
Q9. Should a listed company immediately deny every false online rumour about itself?
Not in every case. The company may still be investigating, may possess unpublished material information or may need to coordinate with the exchange or regulators. Legal, IR and communications teams should integrate factual verification, timely disclosure, corrective communication, takedown or other legal measures and inside-information controls before speaking.
Q10. What should a firm do first when it suspects manipulation or another trading-control failure?
Preserve the objective evidence before informal interviews: complete order-event and execution data, market data, algorithm versions and parameters, API logs, chats and email, device and authentication data, investment records, related-account information, funding and approvals. Then control further trading and information dissemination, identify conflicts and establish an appropriate investigation structure.
About the Legal Update Series by Kenshiro Michishita
SAKURA Law Office publishes the Legal Update series through the profile of Managing Partner Kenshiro Michishita, addressing major issues affecting businesses and management in corporate law, M&A, cross-border transactions, international disputes, financial regulation, Web3, AI and technology, data protection, intellectual property, employment, crisis management and internal investigations. No. 24 addresses insider trading and listed-company information governance, No. 25 addresses Japan’s tender-offer and large-shareholding reporting regimes, and this fully revised No. 26 addresses the wider market-integrity framework governing trading conduct, communications, algorithms, high-speed trading and short positions.
SAKURA Law Office — Official Website
Kenshiro Michishita, Managing Partner — Profile
How SAKURA Law Office Can Assist
SAKURA Law Office advises listed companies, executives, securities firms, asset managers, hedge funds, private equity sponsors, proprietary trading businesses, overseas investors and other market participants on Japanese market manipulation, fictitious and matched trading, spoofing, rumour dissemination and fraudulent schemes, short-selling regulation, algorithmic and high-speed trading, insider trading, tender offers, large-shareholding reporting, market communications, trading-surveillance frameworks, internal investigations and responses to inquiries or investigations by the SESC, exchanges and securities firms. In cross-border matters, we coordinate in English with overseas headquarters, foreign counsel, investment banks, funds and trading firms so that Japanese market-integrity requirements are integrated into the global trading and compliance framework.
Contact
For advice concerning market manipulation, rumour dissemination, fraudulent schemes, short-selling regulation, algorithmic or high-speed trading, or other Japanese market-integrity matters, please contact SAKURA Law Office.
SAKURA Law Office
4F Ark Hills South Tower, 4-5 Roppongi 1-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-0032, Japan
Kenshiro Michishita, Managing Partner
Web: https://sakura-lawyers.jp/en/
Principal References
1 Financial Instruments and Exchange Act — e-Gov Laws (official Japanese text)
2 Order for Enforcement of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act — e-Gov Laws
3 Cabinet Office Ordinance on Restrictions on Securities Transactions, etc. — e-Gov Laws
4 SESC — Unfair Trading / Market Misconduct resources (Japanese)
5 SESC — Administrative Monetary Penalty Casebook: Unfair Trading (June 23, 2026; Japanese)
6 SESC — Market Misconduct press releases for 2026 (Japanese)
7 SESC — Ecomic market-manipulation recommendation (September 15, 2026; Japanese)
14 SESC — Human Metabolome Technologies: rumour-dissemination recommendation (July 26, 2024; Japanese)
15 SESC — Message to the Market on Human Metabolome Technologies (October 17, 2024; Japanese)
16 SESC — Market manipulation involving unauthorized access (December 18, 2025; English)
17 SESC — Message to the Market (September 17, 2026; Japanese)
18 FSA — Legislation submitted to the 221st Diet, including Act No. 64 of 2026
20 FSA — Partial enforcement of 2026 FIEA amendments from August 12, 2026 (Japanese)
21 FSA — Trends in High-Speed Trading (official hub; Japanese)
22 FSA — Trends in High-Speed Trading, January–June 2026 (September 30, 2026; Japanese)
23 FSA — High-Speed Trading registration / regulatory information (Japanese)
24 JPX — Short Selling Restrictions (English)
25 JPX — Information on Outstanding Short Selling Positions (English)
26 JPX — Restrictions on Trading (English)
27 SAKURA Law Office — Official Website
28 SAKURA Law Office — Kenshiro Michishita, Managing Partner — Profile
Disclaimer
This article provides general information based on Japanese laws, official FSA, SESC and JPX materials and general practice publicly available as of October 6, 2026. It does not constitute legal advice or a legal opinion concerning any specific trade, investment strategy, algorithm, short position, public communication, internal investigation or regulatory response. Whether conduct constitutes market manipulation, fictitious or matched trading, rumour dissemination, a fraudulent scheme, a short-selling violation or high-speed-trading misconduct depends on the specific order and execution pattern, purpose, positions, communications, account and funding relationships, venue, algorithmic design, applicable exemptions, timing and other facts. Act No. 64 of 2026 contains provisions that are enacted but not yet in force as of the date of this Update. Specific matters should be assessed under the laws, Cabinet Orders, Cabinet Office Ordinances, exchange rules and current official guidance in force at the relevant time.